32161610 Security Vulnerability - Information disclosure vulnerability

in AOSP Messaging

* Check to make sure the returned uri from the gallery picker does
not point to bugle's data directory (or any subdir).

* Test:
Manual-
* I created the test app in the bug, the one that injects the bad
uri into Bugle. I verified the bad behavior before the fix and the
good behavior after.
* I tested the gallery to make sure picking photos,
from the photos app and drive, still work.
* I verified the behavior in the debugger to be sure the code is
catching the bad uri from the test app.

Change-Id: I3393f3b886c837a49758b91945cf1e17ec9bee41
Fixes: 32161610

src/com/android/messaging/util/FileUtil.java

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 package com.android.messaging.util;
 
 import android.content.Context;
+import android.os.Environment;
 import android.webkit.MimeTypeMap;
 
 import com.android.messaging.Factory;
@@ -116,6 +117,13 @@ public class FileUtil {
         }
     }
 
+    // Checks if the file is in /data, and don't allow any app to send personal information.
+    // We're told it's possible to create world readable hardlinks to other apps private data
+    // so we ban all /data file uris. b/28793303
+    public static boolean isInDataDir(File file) {
+        return isSameOrSubDirectory(Environment.getDataDirectory(), file);
+    }
+
     /**
      * Checks, whether the child directory is the same as, or a sub-directory of the base
      * directory.